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shores amid the freedom-breathing but barbarizing influences of a new colony, can scarcely be over-estimated. Puritanism to such men was a girdle, not a fetter; it held them together and made them march forward in line, instead of straggling along without aim or purpose. But in time the girdle became a chain; the people began to fret under it and threw it off; and this was the very period at which Edwards and Franklin appeared. The one contended stoutly for the old faith, in all its strictness and with all its alarming penalties for sin; the other, with genial and prudent good nature, sought to introduce a milder sway, more friendly to the general development of mankind. Both were powerful forces, and had other forces more powerful behind them; but the time had come for Puritanism to withdraw from the scene, and the controversial writings of Edwards furnished the salvo of theological artillery under cover of which the army of the Puritans fell back in good order, leaving the field to Democracy and the philanthropists.

MAN'S FREEDOM IN HIS MORAL NATURE.

BY ROWLAND G. HAZARD.

[In the July number we quoted largely from the first part of Dr. Hazard's new book on "Man a Creative First Cause." The following extracts are from the second part and the notes of the same work, under the general title of "Man in the Sphere of his own Moral Nature a Supreme Creative First Cause."—ED.]

[*A Cognitive Sense includes a Moral Sense.*]

The phenomena of the external are brought within range of our immediate mental perceptions by means of the external organs of sense. For the internal cognitive spontaneity, the main, if not the only, immediate instrumentalities seem to be the attributes (senses?) of memory and association, singly and in combination; but its genesis is often, perhaps always, by suggestion from the bodily organs, through the senses or the appetites, which much resemble and are closely allied to the senses. The sound of a cannon may call up our knowledge of the battle of Waterloo. The continual flow of ideas through the mind, singly or in trains or

groups, is to it an exhaustless source of knowledge. If the mind ever became wholly inactive and oblivious, it could only be aroused and rescued from annihilation by some extrinsic agency. Our spontaneous cognitions of external objects and contemporaneous changes may be presented by the bodily organs of sense in any possible order or combination, and the internal phenomena may come into notice in a like manner, though in the latter the combinations and the order of succession seem to be more subordinated to the associations of experience.

The cognitive sense seems then to be, as it were, the common terminus of the arrangement, organism, or means by which both objective and subjective phenomena are immediately presented to the mind. These presentations become the subjects of our judgments, which may also be with or without preliminary effort: *e. g.*, we perceive at once the difference in the size of a pea and an orange, but do not thus perceive the equality of the sum of the angle of a triangle to two right angles.

To illustrate these processes, suppose the four letters *f, t, i, a*, are put before me to form into a word. It may so happen that I will see them at first glance in the order *fiat*, and the thing is done, or I may have to proceed tentatively through few or many of the combinations which the letters admit of. So, too, the internal may accidentally come into view in such order that some new relation is immediately apparent and seems like a sudden flash illuminating the mind from without, without any agency of its own.

We distinguish the various perceptions of the one cognitive sense, first as objective and subjective, and then classify the former as senses of seeing, hearing, etc.; and, in regard to the latter, we speak of the sense of beauty, of order, of justice, honor, shame, etc. When the subject of these cognitions, and of the judgments upon them, spontaneous or otherwise, is that of moral right and wrong, they constitute the genetic elements of the *moral sense*. But the mere perception or judgment as to right and wrong has of itself no more effect upon the sensibilities than the cognition that twice five are ten has. It is not till we regard it as practically applied in action that it produces any emotion. Such action in others, when it is right, elicits our approval or admiration, and, when wrong, our censure or indignation; and in ourselves the triumph of the right inspires us with the pleasurable and elevating emotion of victory, while the yielding to the temptation to wrong brings with the painful feelings of debility self-debasement and dishonor. It is in these emotions of glory and of shame thus excited that we find the manifestation or development of conscience, which is properly the *moral sense*, to the sensations of which the cognition of right and wrong is only a prerequisite. Nor is it

material to the quality of our action whether these cognitions are true or false, for the moral virtue of our action all lies in our conforming them to our *convictions* of duty; and hence, though false convictions may cause our actions to be unwise, they do not affect their morality.

[*The Poetic and the Prosaic Mode of discovering and expounding Truth.*]

For the acquisition of knowledge by effort, mind has two distinct modes—observation and reflection. By the former we note the phenomena which are cognized by the senses, and by the latter we trace out the relations among the ideas—the knowledge—we already have in store, and thus obtain new perceptions, new ideas. A large portion of our perceptions, however acquired, are primarily but imagery of the mind—pictures, as it were, of what we have perceived or imagined. In this form we will, for convenience, designate them as *primitive perceptions* or *ideals*. By these terms I especially seek to distinguish these perceptions from those which we have associated with words or other signs or representatives of things and ideas.

There is a somewhat prevalent notion that we can think only in words; but it is obvious that we can cognize things for which we have no name, and can also perceive their relations before we have found any words to describe them; and, in fact, such knowledge or perception generally precedes our attempts to describe them.

These primitive perceptions, or *ideals*, are thus independent of the words which we use to represent them, and to which they may have a separate and prior existence. Even when in a strictly logical verbal process we reach a result in words, it is not fully available till, by a reflex action, we get a mental perception of that which those words signify or stand in place of.

Much of our acquired knowledge is of the relations in and between our primitive perceptions.

In the pursuit of truth by reflective effort we have two modes. In the first place we may, through our immediate primitive perceptions of things which are present, or the mental imagery of things remembered, directly note the existing relations among them or their parts without the use of words in the process; or we may substitute words as signs or definitions of these primitive perceptions, and then investigate the relations among the words so substituted.

In the difference of these two modes we find the fundamental distinction between poetry and prose, the former being the ideal or poetic, and the latter the logical or prosaic, method. The poet uses words to present his thoughts, but his charm lies in so using them that the primitive

perceptions—the imagery of his mind—shall be so transferred and pictured in that of the recipient as to absorb his attention to the exclusion of the verbal medium. We see the painting without thinking of the pigments and the shading by which it is impressed upon us. Every reader may experimentally test this distinction.

If it is well founded, he will find that when any portion of a poem, instead of thus picturing the thought on his mind, requires him to get at it by means of the *relations of the terms* in which it is presented, there is a cessation or revulsion of all poetic emotion.

The material universe, which, upon either the ideal or materialistic hypothesis, is the thought and imagery of the mind of God directly impressed on our minds, is the perfect, and perhaps the only perfect, type of the poetic mode.

Poetry, thus depending on this prominence of the primitive perceptions, is the nearest possible approach which language can make to the reality which it represents. Assuming that simple observation is common to both, these two modes of investigation—the one carried on by means of a direct examination of the realities themselves, or mental images of them, the other by means of words or other signs substituted for them—also present the fundamental and most important, if not the only, distinction in our methods of philosophic research and discovery.

[In the Will, a Persistent Effort to actualize its Ideals is the Consummation of Freedom.]

It follows from these positions that, as regards the moral nature, there can be no failure except the failure to will, or to make the proper effort. The human mind, with its want, knowledge, and faculty of effort, having the power within and from itself to form its creative preconceptions, and to will their actual realization independently of any other cause or power, up to the *point of willing*, is, in its own sphere, an independent creative first cause. Exterior to itself it may not have the power to execute what it wills, it may be frustrated by other external forces, and hence, in the *external*, the ideal incipient creation may not be consummated by finite effort. But as in our *moral nature* the willing, the persevering effort is itself the consummation, there can in it be no such failure; and the mind in it is therefore not only a creative, but a SUPREME CREATIVE FIRST CAUSE.

We have, then, between effort in the sphere of the moral nature and in that sphere which is external to it this marked difference: that while in the external there must be something beyond the effort—*i. e.*, there must be that subsequent change which is the object of the effort before the

creation is consummated—in the sphere of the moral nature the effort for the time being is itself the consummation, and thus, if by repetition, ideal or actual, made *habitual*, becomes a permanent constituent of the character which through habitual *action* will be obvious to others; will be a *permanent palpable* creation.

In his internal sphere, then, man has, to the fullest extent, the powers in which he is so deficient in the external. In it he can make his incipient creations palpable and permanent constituents of his own moral character.

In this permanent incorporation of them with his moral nature, habit has a very important agency. This may be cultivated and its efficiency increased by intelligent attention, and through it the ideals, the scenic representations which are continually being acted in the theatre within us, may be made available in advance of actual experience, for which, as already suggested, they serve as a substitute, and with some decided advantages in their favor.

In the *sphere of its own moral nature*, then, whatever the finite mind really wills is as immediately and as certainly executed as is the will of Omnipotence in its sphere of action, for the willing in such case is itself the final accomplishment, the terminal effect, of the creative effort.

We must here be careful to distinguish between that mere abstract judgment, or knowledge, of what is *desirable* in our moral nature, and the want and the effort to attain it. A man may know that it is best for him to be pure and noble, and yet, in view of some expected or habitual gratification, not only not want to be *now* pure and noble, but be absolutely opposed to being made so, even if some external power could and would effect it for him. We may, however, remark that, as the moral quality of the action lies wholly in the will, and no other being can will for him, to be morally good without his own effort is an impossibility; all that any other being can do for him in this respect is to increase his knowledge and excite his wants, and thus induce him to put forth his own efforts. Even Omnipotence can do no more than this, for making a man virtuous without his own voluntary co-operation involves a contradiction. The increase of virtuous efforts indicates an improvement in the character of the cultivated wants and an increase of the knowledge by which right action is incited and directed. The influence of such knowledge and wants, becoming persistent and fixed by habit, forms, as it were, the substance of virtuous character.

In the sphere of the internal as well as in the external, the last we know of our agency in producing change is our effort. But in our moral nature the effort is itself the consummation. The effort of a man to be pure and noble is actually being pure and noble. The virtue in the time

of that effort all lies in or in and within the effort, and not in its *success or failure*. It is for the time being just as perfect if no external or no permanent results follow the effort. If the good efforts are transitory, the moral goodness will be equally so, and may be as mere flashes of light upon the gloom of a settled moral depravity.

Nor does the nature of the actual resulting effect make any difference to the moral quality of the effort. A man's intentions may be most virtuous, and yet the actual consequences of his efforts be most pernicious. On the other hand, a man may be as selfish in doing acts in themselves beneficent—may do good to others with as narrow calculations of personal benefit—as in doing those acts which he knows will be most injurious to his fellow-men; and doing such good for selfish ends manifests no virtue, whether that end be making money or reaching heaven, and brings with it neither the self-approval nor the elevating influences of generous self-forgetting or self-sacrificing action.

A man who is honest only because it is the more gainful would be dishonest if the gains thereby were sufficiently increased. Such honesty may indicate that he is intelligent and discreet, but virtue is not reached till he acts not from sordid and selfish calculations, but from a sense of right and duty. And it is not consummated and established in him till he feels the wrong doing as a wound, leaving a blemish on the beauty and a stain on the purity of the moral character, the preservation and improvement of which have become his high absorbing interest, and its construction and ideal contemplation of which he has come to appreciate and to value above all other possessions and all possible acquisitions.

The consequences of a volition may prove that it was unwise, but can not affect its moral status. If at the time of the effort one neither did nor omitted to do anything in violation of his own perceptions or sense of duty, he did no moral wrong, and any subsequent consequences can not change the moral nature of the past action. No blame or wrong can be imputed to one who did the best he knew.

[Man's Supremacy in the Domain of his own Moral Nature indicates it as his Especial Sphere of Action.]

We have now endeavored to show that the only efficient cause of which we have any real knowledge is mind in action, and that there cannot be any unintelligent cause whatever.

That every being endowed with knowledge, feeling, and volition is, in virtue of these attributes, a self-active independent power, and in a sphere which is commensurate with its knowledge a creative first cause therein, freely exerting its powers to modify the future and make it dif-

ferent from what it otherwise would be; and that the future is always the composite result of the action of all such intelligent creative beings.

That in this process of creating the future every such conative being, from the highest to the lowest, acts with equal and perfect freedom, though each one—by its power to change the conditions to be acted upon, or, rather, by such change of the conditions, or otherwise, to change the *knowledge* of all others—may influence the free action of any or all of them, and thus cause such free action of others to be different from what but for his own action it would have been.

That every such being has *innately* the ability to will, *i. e.*, make effort which is self-acting; and also the knowledge that by effort it can put in action the powers by which it produces changes within or without itself.

That the only conceivable inducement or *motive* of such being to effort is a desire—a want—to modify the future for the gratification of which it directs its effort, by means of its knowledge.

That when such being so directs its effort by means of its *innate* knowledge, it is what is called an *instinctive* effort, but is still a self-directed and, consequently, a *free* effort.

That when the mode or plan of action is devised by itself, by its own preliminary effort, it is a *rational* action.

That when, instead of devising a plan for the occasion, we through memory adopt one which we have previously formed, we have the distinguishing characteristic of *habitual* action.

In the instinctive and habitual we act promptly from a plan ready formed in the mind, requiring no premeditation as to the mode or plan of action.

But in all cases our effort is incited by our want, and directed by means of our knowledge to the desired end, which, whatever the particular exciting want, is always to in some way affect the future. In our efforts to do this in the sphere external to us, which is the common arena of all intelligent activity, we are liable to be more or less counteracted or frustrated by the efforts of others. In it man is a co-worker with God and with all other conative beings, and in it can influence the actual flow of events only in a degree somewhat proportioned to his limited power and knowledge.

But that in the sphere of man's own moral nature the effort is itself the consummation of his creative conceptions, and hence in this sphere man is a *supreme* creative first cause limited in the effects he may then produce only by that *limit* of his knowledge by which his creative pre-conceptions are circumscribed.

And further, that as a man directs his act by means of his knowledge, and can morally err only by *knowingly willing* what is wrong, his *knowl-*

edge as to this is infallible, and as his *willing* is his own free act, an act which no other being or power can do for him, he is in the sphere of his moral nature a sole creative cause, solely responsible for his action in it.

[*The Materialistic Hypothesis not sufficient to account for the Genesis of Action or Change.*]

The advocates of materialistic causation in the outset, as might have been anticipated, encounter serious difficulty as to the genesis of action or change. For the inauguration of change, a self-active power, or cause, is essential. We do not differ materially as to the problem presented for solution. Bain, one of the most able and thorough expounders of the materialistic doctrine, says: "*The link between action and feeling for the end of promoting the pleasure of exercise is the precise link that must exist from the commencement; the pleasure results from the movement, and responds by sustaining and increasing it. The delight thus feeds itself.*" ("The Emotions and the Will," chap. ii, p. 315.) Passing over some of the many assumptions of this statement, I would inquire how began, or whence came, this "*commencement*" of this "*movement*," from which *results the pleasure of exercise which responds by sustaining and increasing it, and thus feeds itself?* In the same paragraph, in connection with such muscular *exercise*, he speaks of "spontaneous movements being commenced," and after it says, "We must suppose the rise of an *accidental movement*," and again of "*the random tentatives arising through spontaneity.*" From all this the legitimate inference seems to be that he regards these movements as commencing without any cause or reason whatever. The materialistic theory could reach no farther than this, and here stops far short of the generalization by which I have identified these genetic instinctive movements with our subsequent voluntary, rational actions, with no generic difference in the actions themselves, but only distinguished by the different manner in which we become possessed of the knowledge by means of which we direct our efforts to produce such movements.

The advocates of material causation rely much upon physiology to support their views, and think they find empirical confirmation of them in the phenomena of the nervous system—its material structure of brain, spinal column, ganglions, and nerve-centres, with its connecting and permeating nerve-fibres, with nerve currents, similar to the electric, flowing through them. This is a very interesting and a very useful branch of physiological research, but I fail to see its bearing upon the question as to what is the efficient cause, and what its nature and properties.

Suppose a man is looking at the machinery in a mill, the propelling

power of which is, as is common, in a separate room. The observer, in tracing the source of motion, finds first the main shaft or axis coming through the division wall which limits his sight, and upon it a very large main or driving wheel, or pulley. This main shaft extending through a large portion of the room and having upon it other lesser pulleys, from which other motion is communicated by belts to other shafts on either side, and from these, and in some cases directly from the main shaft, the motion is communicated by smaller belts to the various machines, and in some of these by small cords to each portion of them. In this arrangement, with its large driving wheel at the head of the main shaft with other pulleys on the same, with the belts leading from them and putting other shafts on each side in motion, and the smaller belts and cords giving motion to each separate machine, and finally, in some, to each minute individual part—each particular spindle—we have an apparatus very analogous to that of the brain, spinal axis, ganglia, or nervous centres, and connecting and permeating fibres of the nervous system; but no one, by any examination of the phenomena, would, in this application and distribution of the power to the machinery, learn anything as to the *nature* or kind of power in the adjoining room. He could only learn what it could *do*. He could not even tell whether it was a steam-engine or a water-wheel. In view of the results of physical science, its votaries would not hesitate to assert that, be it what it may, the *solar heat* is one of the intermediate agencies of its efficacy, and, if my views are correct, it is at least equally certain that in regard to both the mill and the nervous system the genesis of the power is *intelligence in action*.

Many of Bain's statements as to the spinal axis, the ganglia, the nerves with their nerve-currents and counter-currents passing to and fro in the transmission and distribution of power, would require very little change in the phraseology to make them pertinent to the shafts, pulleys, and belts which constitute the motor apparatus of the mill.

He says: "When the mind is in exercise of its functions, the physical accompaniment is the passing and repassing of innumerable streams of nervous influence;" and, as an inference from this, says: "*It seems as if we might say, no currents, no mind.*" ("The Senses and the Intellect," 2d edition, p. 66.)

So, too, when the steam-engine, or other motive power, of the mill is performing its functions, there is a constant passing and repassing of the belts through which its power or influence is distributed and communicated to the machinery; but the logical inference in both cases seems to be, not that in the absence of these movements there would be no power or cause, but simply that when there is no *action of the power or cause*

there is no effect. If the apparatus ceased to move, we could not thence conclude that the *unseen power* had ceased to exist. It might be merely detached, and, with undiminished vigor, still be performing its functions, and even with its activity increased, by being rid of the attachments which had encumbered and retarded it.

The conclusion of Bain assumes that the "passing and repassing"—the movement—is itself the genetic cause to which there is no antecedent cause. He thus consistently puts it in the same category with those "accidental movements" and "random tentatives" of which he has before spoken.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

BERTRANDO SPAVENTA.

[The following interesting account of the Italian philosopher is translated from the columns of the "*Corriere Calabrese*," of March 2, 1883, by Miss Virginia Champlin for this journal.—ED.]

Bertrando Spaventa, whose loss we are now deploring, was born of parents in moderate circumstances, in 1817, in Bomba, a small town in Abruzzo Chietino. His early education was acquired in the seminary of Chieti, where he soon displayed great intelligence, and where, when quite young, he became a professor of mathematics and philosophy. He then went to teach in the convent of Montecasino, and, after a year or so, went to the Cava dei Tirreni, where he taught a long while in the college of the Benedictine monks. With his brother Silvio he joined those who worked for the political restoration of Italy, and, when they dispersed after the deeds of '48, he removed to Turin, where he lived until 1860, teaching philosophy. In this year he was made Professor of Philosophy in the University of Bologna, where he remained one year, and since 1862 he has taught theoretical philosophy in the University of Naples.

Having an eminently comprehensive intellect, he soon saw that a profound study of philosophy is impossible without a study of the history of philosophy, and, in order to be able to understand the greatest philosophers in their own idiom, he mastered not only Greek, but modern literatures—French, English, and especially German. Together with his brother